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On the limits of the relation of
disgust to judgments of immorality
Mary H. Kayyal*, Joseph Pochedly, Alyssa McCarthy and James A. Russell
Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA
Two correlational studies (ns = 400; 90) examined the association of judgments of
immorality and disgust (hypothesized in much current research and theory). Across
40 scenarios in Study 1, immorality was positively correlated with negative emotions,
especially anger. With anger partialed, disgust was significantly, but weakly, correlated
with immorality, r(38) = 0.22, p < 0.05. Study 2 asked whether the immorality-disgust
correlation is due to a confound: immoral events often include elements implicitly
or explicitly implying pathogens, such as blood or semen. Across 22 scenarios,
those implying pathogens were associated with disgust, but those without pathogens,
whether moral or immoral, rarely were. We propose that the relation between disgust
and immorality is largely coincidental, resulting from (a) using the word disgust to express
anger with or even dislike of immoral acts and (b) the presence of incidental elements
capable of eliciting disgust.
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Introduction
Most of us ﬁnd some events both immoral and disgusting (for example, sex with a rotting corpse).
The association of immorality with disgust in such events might be simply a coincidence, just as we
ﬁnd some immoral events occur on a Tuesday. Proclaiming an immoral event as disgusting might
also be a metaphorical way of speaking. That is, most of us feel bad about immoral events – they
anger us, we dislike them – and we might express those feelings by exclaiming, “that’s disgusting!”
just as we might say, “that stinks!” Doing so might serve to induce stronger feelings in the listener.
On the other hand, much theorizing and research in moral psychology today suggests that the
association of immorality with disgust is more than coincidence or metaphor. These accounts are
part of a broader enterprise in which emotion more generally, rather than just cold reasoning, is
involved in moral judgment (Kagan, 1984; Shweder and Haidt, 1993; Prinz, 2006). Avramova and
Inbar (2012, p. 170) observed that, “most current psychological accounts of moral judgment hold
that aﬀect plays an important role.” And, disgust is a prime focus in these accounts. Chapman and
Anderson (2014, p. 341) proclaimed an “emerging consensus that disgust plays a role in human
morality.” Indeed, some theorists posit a role of disgust for the entire domain of moral judgment
(Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008; Chapman et al., 2009; Chapman and Anderson,
2013, 2014). An evolutionary account of disgust has been oﬀered in which disgust began as a
mechanism to avoid disease carried by food, but was co-opted to avoid other potential harms,
including social disruption and violation of moral norms (Haidt et al., 1994; Tybur et al., 2009).
Darley and Pittman (2003) proposed that “moral outrage” underlies retribution, withmoral outrage
including disgust, anger, and contempt. On one theory, some events are found immoral, at least in
part, because they are disgusting: Haidt (2001) theorized that moral judgments are often post hoc
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rationalizations of gut-level intuitions, often disgust reactions.
Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2012, p. 1) not only agreed on
disgust’s causal role on moral judgments – calling disgust an
“irrational and inﬂexible inﬂuence on our moral judgments” –
but also suggested that disgust therefore plays “a powerful role in
shaping cultural attitudes, politics, and law.” Focus on the role
of disgust in moral judgment has reached beyond psychology.
Kelly’s (2014) philosophical account of moral judgment adopted
the evolutionary co-optation account in which disgust now serves
the function of avoiding socio-moral violations.
Other theorists, however, contend that the role of disgust is
limited to certain subclasses of immorality such as violations
of purity and autonomy (Rozin et al., 2009; Preston and Ritter,
2012; Graham et al., 2013; Feinberg et al., 2014). We return
to the claim that the role of disgust is limited to only certain
classes of immoral events after considering the broader claim
that disgust is associated with judgments of immorality in general
(Chapman and Anderson, 2014). Although Avramova and Inbar
(2012, p. 175) concluded that there is “ample support” for at least
a weak association between disgust and judgments of immorality,
we were less convinced by available evidence. Consider the
evidence taken to support an association between immorality
and disgust. When people freely list the things that disgust
them, the list is long and varied, but includes some events that
are also judged immoral: tabooed sexual acts, brutal beatings,
cheating, stealing, lying, and hypocrisy (Haidt et al., 1994). But,
as we said, some events are both disgusting and immoral, but
that fact does not establish an association between disgust and
immorality beyond coincidence (Inbar and Pizarro, 2014), nor
does it deny an association between morality and any other
negative emotion (such as anger). Words such as disgust are
not used in everyday speech as if they were precise scientiﬁc
terms, but rather in a loose and open-ended manner (Nabi,
2002). When asked to judge how disgusted various immoral
events make them feel, people rate some immoral events as
disgusting (Tybur et al., 2009). Again, such events might be
both immoral and disgusting by coincidence, but an additional
problem sometimes arises: participants are sometimes limited to
one emotion option—disgust. Given that constraint, participants
might have been especially inclined to use the word disgust
to express their general dislike. Our criticism is consistent
with the interpretation that the word disgust is being used
metaphorically (Royzman and Sabini, 2001; Bloom, 2004; Oaten
et al., 2009).
Some studies oﬀered evidence that immoral events are
associated with moral disgust more than with other emotions.
For example, participants say that they feel moral disgust more
intensely than any other emotion (when given a list including
anger, contempt, sadness, and fear/anxiety) in response to a wide
range of immoral events (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011). But
again, a methodological point arises: participants responded to
the labelmoral disgust rather than just disgust, and the wordmoral
did not precede any of the other emotion options. Aﬃxing the
word moral to an emotion word increases that emotion’s moral
relevance (Russell et al., 2013). Thus, the association between
moral disgust and immoral events may have been due to the
word moral. Russell et al. (2013) found that, when this problem
is corrected, anger is indeed the more prominent response to
immorality.
Some studies have oﬀered evidence that immoral events are
associated with disgust – rather than moral disgust – speciﬁcally.
In these studies, however, disgust was associated with a subset
of immoral events, primarily those that included (explicitly or
implicitly) possible contact with pathogens through sex, blood,
rotten food, a corpse, and the like (Rozin et al., 1999; Russell et al.,
2013). Disgust was less frequently associated with immoral events
that lacked contact with matters not themselves disgusting—
events such as theft or disrespect. As pointed out in a recent
review (Royzman et al., 2014), the studies that most clearly
support an association between disgust and immorality confound
immorality with elements that are disgusting anyway because of
an association with pathogens.
Some studies have attempted to rule out the pathogen
confound by showing, for example, that participants report
feeling disgusted by immoral events that do not explicitly involve
pathogens such as sex, violence, and death. In a study directly
examining the pathogen confound, participants reported feeling
disgusted in response to knowingly eating cloned meat explicitly
said to be disease-free (Gutierrez et al., 2012). Again, we are
less convinced by such evidence. Humans and other animals
cannot detect pathogens directly, but must rely on detectable
correlates, especially the vectors and visible consequences of
pathogens. Sex, violence, and death are just such correlates and
might be evolutionarily based signs of possible pathogens. That
is, during phylogenesis and ontogenesis, disgust could not be
associated with disease-causing pathogens directly (which are
beyond our ability to perceive), but only with possible correlates
of disease. Eating something never eaten before risks exposure
to pathogens. A verbal statement that something is disease-free
might be insuﬃcient to bypass the association of disgust with
meat not previously eaten.
Here we report two studies that explore the hypothesis that
judgments of immorality are tied to disgust reactions so weakly
that the association might be coincidence or a metaphorical
way of speaking. The ﬁrst study is on the role of disgust in
moral judgments generally, the second on the possibility that
those events found both disgusting and immoral contain, at least
implicitly, signs of pathogens.
Study 1: Anger, Not Disgust, is Strongly
Related to Moral Judgments
To test the hypothesis that disgust is not the dominant emotional
reaction to actions judged immoral, Study 1 examined the
correlation between judgments of morality and emotion. We
created 40 scenarios in which a protagonist carried out some
action. In a between-subject design, each participant read one
scenario and rated (a) the degree to which he or she felt each of
ﬁve emotions: happy, disgusted, angry, sad, and scared, and (b)
how morally bad or morally good he or she found the action of
the protagonist. We created diﬀerent scenarios such that roughly
half of the scenarios would be judged morally good and half
morally bad. Our anticipations as to morality and as to emotions,
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however, played no role in the data analysis. We simply examined
the correlations between morality and emotion ratings.
Method
Participants
An online sample of 400 participants (n = 186 males; 18–
67 years, Mage = 32 years) was recruited using Amazon Mturk.
Participants gave written informed consent, and the study was
approved by the ethical committee of Boston College.
Scenarios
The 40 scenarios are given in Appendix A.
Survey Ratings
Each scenario was rated by 10 participants. Participants were
randomly assigned to receive one of the 40 scenarios, with the
proviso that the total number receiving each was 10. Participants
were instructed, “Imagine hearing about or witnessing the
following scenario. In the story, one character, Casey (indicated
in bold), is the focus of the two questions below.” Participants
made an emotion judgment and, separately, a morality judgment.
Emotion Judgment
After reading the scenario, the participant was asked, “How
would hear about or witnessing this scenario make you feel?”
The participant rated the degree to which they felt each of ﬁve
emotions: (disgusted, angry, sad, scared, and happy) on a scale
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The instructions
explicitly stated that they could select as many or as few emotions
as they wanted.
Morality Judgment
After the emotion judgment, the participant was asked to judge
“how morally bad or morally good” the protagonist’s action was
by rating it as extremely morally bad, moderately morally bad,
barely morally bad, barely morally good, moderately morally
good, or extremely morally good, coded as −3, −2, −1, 1, 2, and
3, respectively.
Results
Moral Judgment
Participants largely agreed with our a priori categorization of the
scenarios as immoral or moral. The mean morality judgment
(on the −3 to +3 scale, with no 0 option) for the 20 scenarios
anticipated to be immoral was −2.00; and for the 20 scenarios
anticipated to be moral it was 1.90, t(398) = 29.15, p < 0.001.
Dichotomous scores showed the same pattern. Ninety-three
percent of the scenarios anticipated to be immoral were indeed
categorized as immoral (i.e., received a score of −1, −2, or −3);
88% of scenarios anticipated to be moral were indeed categorized
as moral (i.e., received a score of 1, 2, or 3).
Emotion Judgment
Most scenarios were associated with several emotions, albeit
to diﬀerent degrees. Diﬀerent scenarios were even modally
associated with diﬀerent emotions – disgust, anger, sadness, fear,
and happiness – in roughly equal proportion. Appendix A gives
the mean intensity of each emotion for each scenario.
Relation between Moral Judgments and Emotion
Judgments
Table 1 shows that the zero-order Pearson correlation between
emotion intensity and moral judgment was negative and
signiﬁcant (all ps < 0.01) for each of the negative emotions.
Thus, the more disgusting, angering, saddening, or frightful a
story was judged to be the more immoral it was also judged to
be. For happiness ratings, the corresponding correlation failed to
reach signiﬁcance. (Similar results were obtained when emotion
ratings andmoral judgments were dichotomized; phi correlations
are available upon request. Similar correlations were obtained
when Spearman rank correlations were calculated. There is
some controversy concerning whether data from Likert response
formats should be analyzed with parametric or non-parametric
procedures; for a review see Cariﬁo and Perla, 2007).
Emotion judgments were also correlated with each other, and
so the question is which emotions correlated signiﬁcantly with
morality judgments when the others are controlled. Morality
judgments were more strongly related to anger than to disgust,
as indicated by partial correlations (N = 400) between disgust
and morality when controlling for anger and, separately, between
anger and morality when controlling for disgust, as is shown
in Table 1. The correlation between disgust and morality was
reduced when controlling for anger.
A stepwise multiple regression analysis explored which
emotion judgments signiﬁcantly predicted moral judgments.
The ﬁve predictors were participants’ intensity rating for each
emotion: disgust, anger, sadness, fear, and happiness; the
dependent variable was the moral judgment intensity score. At
step 1, anger explained a signiﬁcant proportion of variance in
morality judgments, R2 = 0.29, F(1,398) = 158.48, p< 0.001; for
anger, β= −0.56, t(396)= 12.59, p< 0.001. At step 2, both anger
and disgust judgments entered the equation which resulted in an
incremental change of 0.03 in R2, F(1,397) = 19.77, p < 0.001,
and explained a signiﬁcant proportion of variance in moral
judgments, R2 = 0.32, F(2,397) = 92.86, p < 0.001; both anger
and disgust were signiﬁcant predictors, for anger, β = −0.39,
t(396) = 7.76, p < 0.001; for disgust β = −0.22, t(396) = 4.45,
p < 0.001. Judgments of sadness, happiness, and fear failed to
add a signiﬁcant increment in predicting morality judgments.
Because of multicollinearity, an alternative interpretation of these
results is that negative aﬀect predicts morality judgments.
TABLE 1 | Correlations (N = 400) between emotion intensity and morality,
Study 1.
Partial correlation
Correlation Controlling for anger Controlling for disgust
Anger −0.53∗∗ – −0.36∗∗
Disgust −0.46∗∗ −0.22∗ –
Fear −0.15∗∗ −0.06 0.11∗
Sadness −0.14∗∗ −0.02 −0.13∗∗
Happiness 0.07 0.04 0.04
∗∗denotes significance at 0.01 level; ∗denotes significance at 0.05 level.
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Conclusion
Morality judgments were signiﬁcantly correlated with each of the
negative emotions included, rather than to one speciﬁc emotion.
In general, events that were judged as more emotionally bad
(those that make us feel disgusted, angry, sad, or scared) were also
judged as more morally bad. However, events that were judged as
emotionally good (those that made respondents feel happy) were
not also judged as more morally good.
Anger and disgust were more strongly associated with moral
judgments than were the other negative emotions. Our ﬁndings
with anger resonate with Darley and Pittman’s (2003) focus on
moral outrage, with Rozin et al.’s (1999) inclusion of anger as part
of the reaction to immorality, with Russell et al.’s (2013) evidence
that anger is the more powerful predictor of judgments of
immorality, and with Royzman et al.’s (2014) similar conclusion.
Okimoto and Brescoll (2010, p. 933) assessed “moral outrage”
with items for anger, contempt, and disgust. Factor analysis
indicated that “participants did not distinguish among” them.
When anger was controlled, the association between morality
and fear, and morality and sadness, was negligible. Anger rather
than disgust was most strongly related to moral judgments.
And, only anger remained signiﬁcantly associated with moral
judgments when controlling for disgust. In contrast, disgust lost
much (although not all) of its association with moral judgments
when controlling for anger.
Study 2: Why Might Disgust and
Immorality be Associated?
Study 1 found a negative correlation (albeit weak) between
disgust and immorality when anger was statistically controlled,
and the question is why. One possibility is that immoral events
elicit disgust. Another possibility is that feeling disgust makes
people judge events as immoral. Another is that judging an
event as immoral is expressed by calling it disgusting, a way
of expressing or inducing intense dislike or anger. Yet another
possibility is that immoral events tend to include disgusting
elements: violence can include blood; tabooed sex can imply the
possibility of sexually transmitted diseases, and so on. Indeed,
scenarios for Study 1 with the highest judgments of disgust
involved sex, food, and saliva.
Study 2 examined the possibility advanced by Royzman et al.
(2014) that disgust co-occurs with judgments of immorality
when the immoral event includes signs of potential exposure
to pathogens, but not otherwise. If so, the relation between
disgust and moral judgments is largely coincidental, based on
confounding immoral events with elements capable of eliciting
disgust. Study 2 was also correlational. We created 22 scenarios in
a roughly 2× 2 design by crossing “immoral”–“moral” with “with
pathogens”–“without pathogens.” That is, each scenario was
hypothesized to depict either an immoral (12 scenarios) or not
immoral (10 scenarios) event that either included (implicitly or
explicitly) potential pathogens (13 scenarios) or lacked potential
pathogens (9 scenarios). By “pathogen,” wemean possible sources
of infection, including sexual acts and body ﬂuids or products
(such as saliva, blood, vomit, feces; Tybur et al., 2009). We
also varied our method, participant population, and rating task
slightly from that in Study 1 to ensure that our general results
were robust across such minor variations. For each scenario,
participants selected the single best word to describe their
emotional reaction (from a list of 9 chosen to provide all the basic
emotions plus outrage and contempt as possible expressions of
moral dislike) to the event depicted in the scenario.
Method
Participants
Ninety Boston College undergraduate students (18–21 years, 30
male, 55 female, ﬁve unspeciﬁed) completed the online survey
in return for course credit. Participants gave written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the ethical committee
of Boston College.
Scenarios
We created 22 scenarios in a 2 × 2 design, crossing the
moral and pathogen content. Appendix B gives the scenarios in
these four categories: Immoral with Pathogens, Immoral without
Pathogens, Moral with Pathogens, and Moral without Pathogens.
The scenarios were presented to participants in random order.
Survey Sections
There were two sections presented in counterbalanced order. In
each section, participants were instructed to respond speciﬁcally
to the actions of the protagonist or antagonist in the story (bolded
in Appendix B).
Emotion Judgment
For each scenario, participants were asked to describe how they
felt about the event described in the scenario by selecting one
emotion from a list of nine labels: happy, sad, angry, scared,
surprised, contemptuous, disgusted, outraged, or none of the above.
The participant then rated the intensity of the selected emotion
on a scale ranging from 1 (barely) to 7 (extremely). (In the
analyses, a score of 0 was given when the participant did not
select the emotion.) The none of the above option required any
intensity rating. Participants were asked to respond to each
scenario independently of the others so that an emotion label
could be selected as many times as appropriate across scenarios.
Morality Judgment
For each scenario, participants rated the extent to which the event
described was immoral on a scale ranging from 0 (not immoral at
all) to 6 (extremely immoral).
Results
Manipulation Checks
For each scenario, Appendix B gives disgust and immorality
scores. Intensity scores are means; % yes is the percentage of
participants who selected a value other than zero.
Immorality
Participants agreed with our a priori categorization of the
scenarios as ‘immoral’ or ‘moral.’ The mean immorality intensity
score (on a 0 to 6 scale) for the 12 Immoral scenarios was
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4.5; the corresponding ﬁgure for the 10 Moral scenarios was
0.3, t(89) = 6.72, p < 0.001. Each immoral scenario was rated
as signiﬁcantly more immoral than any moral scenario. The
dichotomous scores yielded similar results. A majority rated all
12 immoral scenarios as immoral, and all 10 moral scenarios as
moral. The mean percentage of yes on the immorality question
for the 12 immoral scenarios was 99%; the corresponding ﬁgure
for the 10 moral scenarios was 4%.
Pathogens
Participants also agreed with our a priori assumption that
scenarios ‘with pathogens’ were more disgusting than those
‘without pathogens,’ although agreement was moderate.
Scenarios with pathogens were associated with disgust more
intensely than scenarios without pathogens (mean disgust
intensity = 1.9 versus 0.2, respectively), t(89) = 22.76, p< 0.001.
More than 50% of participants indicated disgust for 5 of the 13
immoral scenarios, less than 50% of participants did so for all
nine moral scenarios. The mean percentage of yes for disgust was
81% for the 13 scenarios With Pathogens; the corresponding
ﬁgure for the nine scenarios Without Pathogens was 8%.
Relation between Immorality and Disgust
Figure 1 shows the relation of immorality and disgust within each
of the four groups of scenarios: Moral with Pathogens, Immoral
with Pathogens, Moral without Pathogens, and Moral without
Pathogens. In testing our central hypotheses, one complication
arose in that there was no variance in disgust scores for the
Moral without Pathogen group of scenarios. Thus, in statistical
analyses, we needed to circumvent this problem. A preliminary
analysis thus examined whether disgust and immorality ratings
varied separately with the three a priori groups of scenarios (i.e.,
omitting Moral without Pathogen group). There was a main
eﬀect of scenario group, F(2,267) = 627.88, a main eﬀect of
response (disgust versus immorality), F(2,267) = 1825.10, and
most importantly, a scenario group by response interaction, F(2,
267) = 688.99, all ps < 0.001. Thus, immorality and disgust
judgments diﬀered signiﬁcantly.
A correlational analysis examined the relation of immorality
to disgust in more detail. Across the 22 scenarios, the correlation
between mean intensity scores for disgust and those for
immorality failed to reach signiﬁcance, r = 0.08, n.s. (Similar
results were obtained when dichotomous disgust and immorality
scores were substituted; r = −0.18, n.s.) Thus, at the level of
scenarios, immorality and disgust were unrelated.
At the level of individuals, a more mixed result was found.
The ﬁrst analysis used the intensity scores for both disgust
and immorality. The correlation across scenarios (N = 22) was
non-signiﬁcant for 84 (out of 90) participants (range: −0.35
to 0.42); one signiﬁcant correlation was negative, −0.44; the
remaining ﬁve signiﬁcant correlations ranged from 0.43–0.60.
Thus, 5.5% of participants showed a signiﬁcant (α = 0.05)
FIGURE 1 | Relation of immorality and disgust within each of the four groups of scenarios: Moral with Pathogens, Immoral with Pathogens, Moral
without Pathogens, and Moral without Pathogens. The size of the dot represents the number of cases; the larger the dot, the more cases.
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positive correlation between disgust and immorality. A similar
conclusion resulted when dichotomous ratings of disgust and
immorality were substituted for quantitative ratings. Of the 90
participants, the phi correlation between disgust and immorality
judgments (both scored as either 0 or 1) across scenarios (N = 22)
was non-signiﬁcant for 88 participants (range:−0.38 to 0.39); the
two signiﬁcant correlations were 0.45 and 0.51.
The next analysis examined whether those individuals who
found a given scenario more immoral, relative to those who
did not, were more likely to ﬁnd it more disgusting. Of the
22 scenarios, four showed no variance in one or the other
of the two judgments and were excluded from this analysis.
For the remaining 18 scenarios, the correlation between disgust
and immorality intensity judgments across subjects (N = 90)
was non-signiﬁcant for 15 scenarios (range r: −0.16 to 0.19),
but signiﬁcant for three scenarios—all from the Immoral with
Pathogen group: scenario # 1, sex between young and old:
r = 0.46, p < 0.001; scenario # 3, incest: r = 0.54, p < 0.001;
and scenario # 4, brutal beating: r = 0.27, p < 0.02. For
the remaining three scenarios in this group, the correlation
was non-signiﬁcant and for the group as a whole, the mean
correlation was non-signiﬁcant (mean r = 0.17, p = 0.12).
For the remaining two a priori groups of scenarios, there was
no relation between disgust and morality intensity judgments
across subjects (N = 90): Immoral without Pathogens (mean
r = 0.03, p = 0.79); Moral with Pathogens (mean r = −0.11,
p = 0.31). In short, in 3 of the 18 scenarios examined, those
individuals who found the scenario more immoral also found it
more disgusting, but in 15 of the scenarios, no such relation was
found. (Similar results were obtained when dichotomous ratings
were substituted for quantitative ratings; correlations available
upon request.)
Of particular interest is the relation between the dichotomous
disgust scores and the intensity of immorality for the set of
Immoral without Pathogen scenarios. This analysis addresses the
question of whether those who found these scenarios disgusting
found them more immoral. For the six scenarios, the correlation
(N = 90) ranged from 0.05 to 0.14, with a mean of 0.09, all ps n.s.
Negative Reactions to Immoral Events
When not disgusted by immoral scenarios, the percentage of
participants who felt another negative emotion ranged from 3
to 92 (mean = 48) for scenarios with pathogens and from 38
to 89 (mean = 68) for scenarios without pathogens; one felt
happy for one of the 12 immoral scenarios. Immoral scenarios
not found disgusting were nonetheless found negative whether
they included or lacked pathogens, although the diﬀerence
was signiﬁcant (53% versus 74% of participants, respectively,
X2 = 9.51, p < 0.01). Thus, participants disliked immoral
scenarios.
Immoral scenarios not found disgusting were associated with
the full range of negative emotions – including sadness and fear
(emotions not generally linked to immorality but consistent with
Study 1). For the Immoral scenarios with pathogens not found
disgusting, the three most common emotions were fear, anger,
and outrage (17, 13, and 13% of participants, respectively). For
the Immoral scenarios without pathogens not found disgusting,
the three were sadness, anger, and outrage (23, 22, and 21% of
participants, respectively).
Conclusion
Disgust was attributed largely to events — whether immoral
or not — involving, either implicitly or explicitly, signs of
potential exposure to pathogens. Disgust was rarely attributed to
events — whether immoral or not — lacking potential exposure
to pathogens. Speciﬁcally, immoral events without pathogens
were rarely associated with disgust. Although disgust was not
typically or strongly associated with immorality, we found some
possible evidence of association, albeit weak. Disgust judgments
correlated signiﬁcantly with immorality judgments for 5.5% of
participants (but with α = 0.05). Thus, there might exist a small
subset of individuals who ﬁnd more disgusting scenarios more
immoral (or vice versa). We also found that there exists a subset
of scenarios (3 of 18 = 16.67%) —two scenarios involving sex
(incest, sex between a 17- and a 70-years-old), one violence
(brutal beating of a boy) —in which judgments of disgust
correlated with judgments of immorality.
Disgust was not the only negative emotion associated with
judgments of immorality. Figure 2 show that when participants
did not associate disgust to an immoral scenario, they associated
another negative emotion. And, indeed, anger and contempt were
frequently used to describe reactions to various immoral events
(Haidt, 2001, 2003; Nabi, 2002). Immoral events were associated
with a full range of negative emotions, including not only disgust,
anger, and contempt—emotions previously linked to the moral
domain (Izard, 1977; Shweder et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 1999)—but
also fear and sadness not previously linked to the moral domain.
Indeed, all the negative emotions provided were chosen for the
immoral scenarios. This range of negative emotions suggests that
all these terms might be used to express a general feeling of
dislike.
General Discussion
In Study 1, all negative emotions were associated with judgments
of immorality. The strongest association was with anger. With
anger statistically controlled, disgust remained correlated with
immorality, although modestly. Thus, the question arose: why is
disgust associated with immorality? Study 2 found that disgust
was attributed largely to events involving signs of potential
exposure to pathogens, including morally good events (such
as a nurse changing an elderly patient’s feces-covered sheets).
When immorality and exposure to pathogens are separated, the
association of disgust with immorality largely disappeared.
As were many studies in this research domain, our study was
limited to a small set of verbally described scenarios and verbal
ratings. Perhaps behavioral or physiological measures in actual
situations (Chapman et al., 2009) might uncover diﬀerent results.
Nevertheless, our small correlational study does raise questions
about an important set of ideas about morality and disgust.
Our studies showed that although disgust was not typically
or strongly associated with immorality, some association, albeit
weak, does exist. In Study 2, for example, disgust judgments
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of participants who selected disgusted or another negative emotion in each scenario category.
correlated signiﬁcantly with immorality judgments for 5.5% of
participants (but with α = 0.05). Thus, there might exist a small
subset of individuals who ﬁnd more disgusting scenarios more
immoral. The question is whether this association is a matter of
sampling error or, if not, how to interpret that association in light
of the general overall lack of association. One possibility is an
individual diﬀerence variable in attentiveness to internal physical
states. Schnall et al. (2008, Study 2) oﬀered evidence of individual
diﬀerences in the inﬂuence of disgust reactions on subsequent
moral judgments. Speciﬁcally, only those individuals who scored
high on general attentiveness to their internal physical states
judged moral violations more harshly when seated at a dirty desk
than a clean desk. Such evidence, however, does not necessarily
implicate disgust speciﬁcally because sitting at a dirty desk is also
simply unpleasant.
Study 2 also suggested that there exists a subset of scenarios (3
of 18 = 16.67%) within which judgments of disgust correlated
with judgments of immorality. Again, the question is whether
this association is a matter of sampling error or, if not, how to
interpret that association in light of the general overall lack of
association. One possibility is in situations with pathogens those
individuals more sensitive to the presence of pathogens found the
situation more disgusting and the presence of pathogens more
harmful and therefore more immoral. Another possibility is that
immoral events are more disliked than are moral events and
that some individuals express their dislike with the word disgust.
This possibility is consistent with the observation that the word
disgust is often used metaphorically (Royzman and Sabini, 2001;
Bloom, 2004). Indeed, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006, p. 1451) cited
Lakoﬀ’s (1987) work on metaphor to speculate that “individuals
are predisposed to use categories based on bodily experience
(such as clean versus dirty) to construct complex social categories
(such as moral versus immoral).”
Another possible relation between disgust and immorality is
that disgust, like any negative feeling, leads to more negative
judgments in general (e.g., Forgas et al., 1984; Baron, 1987).
This possibility is consistent with the ﬁnding that experimentally
inducing disgust (with fart spray, for example) leads people to
judge others’ moral violations more harshly (Eskine et al., 2011;
Rottman and Kelemen, 2012). Thus, in these studies, the disgust-
immorality association is an example of the well-established
general principle that negative aﬀect leads to negative judgments.
In an attempt to rule out this more general interpretation, two
studies included a sad control group (Horberg et al., 2009,
Study 2; Schnall et al., 2008, Study 4). These studies found
harsher moral judgments in the disgust condition than in the sad
condition, but several concerns remain: for one, disgust might
have been induced with more intensity than was sadness. In
Schnall et al. (2008), for example, the mean intensity of self-
reported disgust for the disgust condition (on a scale from 0 to
21) was 11.25, whereas that for sadness in the sadness condition
was 4.72 (but see Horberg et al., 2009). Another concern is that
sadness includes lower arousal than does disgust, which might
lessen its impact on subsequent judgments.
Whether or not there is some association between disgust
and judgments of immorality, the association found here was
rare and, at most, weak. In both studies, we found disgust in
scenarios that were not found immoral and immoral scenarios
that were not disgusting. Thus, what is immoral is not necessarily
disgusting, and what is disgusting is not necessarily immoral.
Perhaps no theorist meant to claim otherwise, but these ﬁndings
raise a question for those who theorize that disgust is involved in
the judgment of morality (Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Zhong and
Liljenquist, 2006; Schnall et al., 2008; Chapman et al., 2009; Herz
and Hinds, 2013): what in addition to disgust determines whether
the event is found moral or immoral? Because, at most, only some
disgusting events are found immoral, what diﬀerentiates the cases
in which disgust is associated with immorality from those in
which disgust is not? Similarly, at most, only some immoral
events were found disgusting. What diﬀerentiates the cases in
which an immoral event is found disgusting from the cases in
which the immoral event is not?
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Disgust was not the only negative emotion associated with
judgments of immorality. And, indeed, anger and contempt
are frequently used to describe reactions to various immoral
events (Haidt, 2001, 2003; Nabi, 2002). Still, we found that
immoral events were associated with a full range of negative
emotions, including not only disgust, anger, and contempt –
emotions previously linked to the moral domain (Izard, 1977;
Shweder et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 1999; Russell and Giner-
Sorolla, 2013) – but also fear and sadness not previously linked
to the moral domain. Indeed, all the negative emotions provided
were chosen for the immoral scenarios. This range of negative
emotions suggests that all these terms were used to express a
general feeling of dislike, consistent with the notion that the
emotion of disgust has vaguely deﬁned boundaries and conveys
disapproval across many disparate domains (Strohminger, 2014).
If so, then the use of disgust too might express a general
dislike.
Immoral events were associated with a range of negative
emotions in both studies, but we speculate that these same
negative emotions occur as reactions to events not deemed
immoral. The association between negative emotions and
morality judgments could be tested with the simple correlational
design used here. If our speculation is supported, the question
then arises: what in addition to a negative emotion determines
whether the event is found moral or immoral? Some theorists
have suggested that disgust is the basis of judgment of
immorality in only certain domains. Our interpretation that
immoral scenarios are judged disgusting when they involve
signs of potential pathogens overlaps with hypotheses that
immoral scenarios are judged immoral when they involve purity
violations – a more psychological form of contamination deﬁned
as spiritual deﬁlement or disrespecting the “natural order of
things” and the sanctity of one’s body (Rozin et al., 1999, p. 576).
Despite this overlap, our hypothesis is fundamentally diﬀerent.
Studies that speciﬁcally linked disgust to purity violations often
used as examples various taboos that involve sexual- or food-
related behaviors (e.g., Haidt et al., 1994, 1997; Rozin et al.,
1999; Gutierrez and Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Olatunji et al., 2007;
Horberg et al., 2009). Such violations of “purity” involve potential
pathogens (or vectors or consequences of pathogens). On the
account we favor, the potential pathogens are the simplest
explanation, and there is no need to invoke “purity” in these
cases. Royzman et al. (2014) recently oﬀered empirical evidence
supporting just such an interpretation. In future research,
pathogens and purity must be disentangled by examining disgust
attributions to immoral events that involve purity violations,
but lack pathogens or their correlates. Such separation may be
more diﬃcult than it seems, however, because disgust is not
elicited directly by disease and toxins, but by signs of them.
Thus, verbal assurances that the elicitor is sterilized or otherwise
protected from disease may leave intact the evolutionarily
based signs of disease. A further diﬃculty is that the word
disgust is used broadly to express anger and dislike (Nabi,
2002).
An association between disgust and immorality has been
bolstered by an evolutionary argument. The basic idea is that the
disgust mechanism for rejecting potentially harmful foods was
co-opted to respond to potentially harmful social interactions
(Tybur et al., 2009). To our knowledge, the theory of re-
purposing of the disgust mechanism was supported by no direct
evidence, but indirectly by ﬁnding a purportedly primal disgust
reaction (e.g., facial expression) purportedly elicited by moral
actions (Cannon et al., 2011; Chapman and Anderson, 2013; but
see Pochedly et al., in preparation), and also by research showing
that participants tasting bitter substances make harsher moral
evaluations (Eskine et al., 2011). The current studies, however,
challenge the purportedly evolved association between immoral
actions and disgust speciﬁcally (above and beyond anger). If the
association of immorality with disgust is as weak and limited as
suggested by the current studies, an evolutionary explanation for
that association is neither necessary nor useful.
The association between disgust and morality is weak. It is
suﬃciently weak that a direct link is questionable. What link
exists would then be indirect. One indirect link would be simply
coincidence: events found immoral sometimes include signs —
blood, saliva, semen — of possible pathogens. Another indirect
link is the semantics of the word disgust, which is used to convey
a range of feelings including anger and disapproval (Nabi, 2002).
It remains to be seen if there is any other link.
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